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Imagine that you are sick. You go to your doctor who prescribes
to you the antibiotic Flagyl. On the way home from the doctor's oce, you
make a stop at the drug store to get the prescription lled. While you wait
for the pharmacist to complete his service, you purchase some cough syrup to
ease your discomfort. Unfortunately, that evening your illness may turn into a
violent episode of nausea and vomiting. It is only later, after hours of sickness,
that you recover your senses, read the package insert that came with the cough
syrup, and recall the hurried words of your doctor: combining Flagyl with even
a minimal amount of alcohol severely poisons your system. Putting two and two
together, but much too late, you notice that your cough syrup contains 3.5%
alcohol. Would that you knew.
The above scenario is neither dicult to imagine nor uncommon.
The FDA estimates that 30 to 55% of American patients fail to comply with their
prescription drug instructions.1 Given that American doctors write over 1.5
billion prescriptions every year,2 we should not be surprised by the high number
of adverse reactions to prescription drugs.3 Violent nausea and vomiting is only
1Ken Rankin, Pharmacists Get Consultation Wake Up Call, Drug Store News, May18,
1992 at s17.
2David A. Kessler, Communicating With Patients About Their Medications, 325 New Eng.
J. Med. 1650 (1991)
3Terence C. Green, Licking, Sticking, Counting, and Pouring{Is That All Pharmacists
1a mild example of the dangers associated with misuse of prescription drugs.
One report nds that prescription drug misuse results in approximately 125,000
patient deaths every year.4 Though no price can be placed on human life, hard
economics often drives the considerations behind drug regulation in America.
Accordingly, turning to quantitative terms, studies show that patient misuse of
prescription drugs has resulted in over 4.5 billion dollars in extra hospital costs5
and countless more billions in lost working hours and other opportunity costs.6
These dire ramications of patient misuse, both human and eco-
nomic, beg for a more eective mechanism of drug warning. According to David
Kessler, Commissioner of the FDA, a primary cause of this patient misuse is the
wide communication gap that has long existed between the health care provider
and the patient.7 Often overlooked in this health care dynamic is the criti-
cal role of the pharmacist. Their proximity to actual drug consumption help
pharmacists maintain a unique position in the chain of health care provision.
This position enables pharmacists to reach out to patients toward safer, more
eective prescription drug treatment.
This paper argues in favor of a duty to warn on the part of the
pharmacist. In the next section, I begin with a discussion of two common
regulatory approaches to warning patients of prescription drug hazards and
esh out their inadequacies. In section three, I will discuss the legal status of
Do?, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1449 (1991).
4David E. Smith & John C. West, A Prescription For Liability: The Pharmacy Mandate of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and Its Impact Upon Pharmacists' Common
Law Duties, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. 127, 129 (1994).
5Green, 24 Creighton L. Rev, at 1449.
6smith & West, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. at 129.
71991: Retail Pharmacy in Mid Life Crisis, Drug Store News, April 20, 1992 at 30A.
2the pharmacist's duty to warn and the negative reaction to the current trends
in that doctrine. Then, in section four, I will go on to propose an alternative
model for the duty to warn, explore arguments in support of this model, and
nally attempt to reconcile the proposed duty to warn scheme with the primary
theoretical underpinnings of drug regulation in the United States.
II.Coon Approaches to Prescription Drug Warning
Leaving aside the role of the pharmacist for the moment, the regu-
latory scheme for warning patients of prescription drug hazards consists of the
learned intermediary doctrine and patient package inserts. It is obvious from the
widespread misuse of prescription drugs that this approach fails to suciently
warn the public of the hazards associated with prescription drugs.
A.The Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Traditionally, the law's attempt to disclose to patients the hazards
of prescription drugs has operated through a two-pronged duty. First, the man-
ufacturer has a duty to inform the physician about the uses and hazards of its
drug; second, the physician has a duty to relate to each of her patients the
dangers of using that prescription drug.8 In other words, the physician is the
learned intermediary between the drug manufacturer and the patient. Advo-
cates of the learned intermediary doctrine reason that since the physician is
closely familiar with the patient's medical history, she is in the best position to
discern what risks may aect her patient and to assess the need to inform the
patient of those risks.9 Because of the unique relationship between doctor and
8Green, 24 Creighton L. Rev, at 1459.
91d. at 1459 o60.
3patient, supporters argue, the legal duty to warn is best placed on the physician,
not the pharmacist.
Too many patients suer from avoidable injury for the learned in-
termediary doctrine to claim success. In part, the doctrine's malfunction may
derive from a misplaced assumption regarding the ow of information in the
physician-patient relationship. Another explanation of its failure to adequately
protect the public focuses on the fact that 68% of physicians decide against full
disclosure of hazards to their patients.10 Further, the courts and FDA agree,
that for certain types of drugs, the learned intermediary doctrine will fail to
protect the consumer. In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,11 for
example, the court noted that the learned intermediary doctrine does not ap-
ply to drugs with particular characteristics { where the role of the prescribing
physician is passive, the warnings concerning the drug are complex, or in the
presence of a high likelihood of side eects, the learned intermediary doctrine
fails. That the doctrine is not eective for all drugs, along with its failure to
adequately inform the public of the hazards of prescription drugs points up the
inability of the learned intermediary doctrine to serve as the chief implement in
the law's attempt to warn patients of prescription drug hazards.
B. Patient Package Inserts
Section 502(f) of the Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act calls
upon the FDA to outlaw any drug unless its labeling bearssuch adequate warn-
ings against use in those pathological conditions or by children where its use
10David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn: Toward a Knowledge-Based
Model of Professional Responsibility, 40 Drake L. Rev. 1, 12 n. 56 (1990-91).
11394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985).
4may be dangerous to health, or against unsafe dosage or methods or duration
of administration or application as are necessary for the protection of users.12
Charged with this responsibility and cognizant of the need to supply
the public with adequate warnings regarding their prescription drugs, the FDA
in 1979 proposed a scheme of patient package inserts (PPIs).13 In addition to
supplying information to physicians, the regulation would require that a PPI
accompany each prescription drug dispensed to a consumer. Modeled after the
physician inserts, these PPIs would include warnings of the common hazards
associated with the use of a certain drug. Patient labeling, according to the
FDA, would help solve the problem of a public underwarned of drug hazards.
Citing voluntary action on the part of the pharmaceutical industry,
the FDA revoked the PPI regulation three years after its conception.14 Today,
the FDA requires PPIs for only a handful of special drugs.15 Beneath this
apparent lack of political viability lie additional shortcomings which render un-
satisfactory a PPI scheme of regulation. Under a PPI warning scheme, a patient
may treat the insert as medical authority and substitute it for the directions
of his health care provider. For example, rather than following his doctor's
orders, the patient may discontinue usage of the drug when symptoms disap-
pear but before completing the required sequence.16 An insert listing hazards
associated with the drug may frighten the patient and contribute to unhealthy
1221 U.S.C. 352 (1992).
1344 Fed. Reg. 40,016 (July 6, 1979).
1447 Fed. Reg. 7200 (Feb 17, 1982); 47 Fed Reg 39,147 (Sept 7, 1982).
1521 C.F.R. S310.501 o516 (1990).
16Demnkovich, FDA in Hot Water Again Over Cost of Proposed Drug Labeling Rule, Na-
tional Journal, Sept 22, 1979 at 1568.
5self-diagnosis.17 Finally, PPIs may serve only to inundate the patient with writ-
ten warnings. Lengthy warnings (in small print) will go unread by the patient,
further inhibiting the eectiveness of PPIs. In terms of a better informed public,
the costs of a PPI regulatory scheme may well outweigh any benets18.
Before 1993, this was the legal regime in place to protect and inform
the public against the hazards of prescription drugs. Persistent drug misuse and
avoidable injury, however, continue to obviate the regime's insuciency. The
public needs more than the learned intermediary doctrine or PPIs. An enhanced
role for the pharmacist as a member of the health care team may provide the
additional security. Signicantly, pharmacists themselves want to play a more
active role.19 One viable method of improving patient awareness to the potential
hazards of prescription drugs is a regulatory scheme which includes a duty to
warn on the part of the pharmacist.
III.The Duty to Warn On The Part Of Pharmacists
A.Common Law Tradition
A court will almost always hold liable a pharmacist who makes
an error in dispensing the prescription drug. Considered a mechanistic task,
lling a prescription is given no latitude for error.20 Slightly more restless is the
doctrine governing the plight of a pharmacist who correctly lls a prescription,
but does not warn the patient of potential side eects of the drug.
The general thrust of the case law nds a pharmacist without a
17Id.
181d.
191d at 1569; Rankin, Drug Store News, May 18, 1992 at s17.
20Brushwood 40 Drake L. Rev, at 18-19.
6substantial duty to warn the patient of drug side eects. Some courts, however,
have held pharmacist to a higher standard. For example, the court in Hand
v. Krakowski21 found negligent a pharmacist who correctly lled a prescription
for a psychotropic drug, but dispensed it to an alcoholic patient. The court
held that the pharmacist had actual knowledge of the customer's alcoholism
and knew or should have known that the prescribed drug and alcohol are con-
traindicated.22 Since he nevertheless continued to rell the prescription for six
years, the court held the pharmacist liable for his actions. Though this case
seems to suggest a duty to warn principle on the part of pharmacists, its rela-
tively narrow factual scenario precludes any signicant precedential eect. It is
rare for a pharmacist to have such clear and personal knowledge concerning a
customer. Moreover, in such situations, where there is virtually no added cost of
acquiring information of a potential hazard, a duty to warn the patients seems
to be a well-founded moral obligation; no legal prod is necessary.
In Rift v. Morgan Pharmacy, the pharmacist also lled the pre-
scription as written by the physician but this time failed to inform the cus-
tomer or the physician of an obvious error in the prescription itself.23 While
the physician's order instructed the patient to administer one suppository every
four hours to ease a headache, the patient went unwarned that no more than two
suppositories should be used per headache and no more than ve used in a single
week. Ignorant of these hazards, the patient misused the drug and sustained
21453 N.Y.5.2d 121 (1982).
22The pharmacist had previously made a note of the patient's alcoholism in his personal
records. Hand, 453 N.Y.5.2d at 123.
23~O~ A.2d 1247 (pa. 1986).
7permanent nerve damage. In support of a safety net of overlapping responsi-
bilities where each member of the health care team is, in part, his brother's
keeper,24 the court held the pharmacist liable for his failure to correct the ob-
vious error in the prescription. Here again, however, the pharmacist's duty to
warn rests on a narrow factual scenario in which the physician's prescription
was clearly erroneous in light of a toxicity well known among pharmacists.
At most, Hand and Rift establish an extremely limited duty to
warn for pharmacists. Far more representative of the courts' position is the
recent Washington State Supreme Court ruling in McKee v. American Home
Products Corp.25 There the court refused to attach liability to a pharmacist
who had accurately lled a prescription but had not warned the patient of the
potential side eects associated with extended use of the prescription drug. In a
lengthy discussion of the issue, the court conrmed that under the learned inter-
mediary doctrine the duty to warn falls only on the shoulders of the physician;
the pharmacist bears no responsibility to convey to the patient nonjudgmen-
tal information regarding potential hazards of drug use. Consistent with Hand
and Rift, the court held that the pharmacist still has a duty to accurately ll
a prescription...and to be alert for clear errors or mistakes in the prescription.
A pharmacist, however, does not...have a duty to...warn customers of the haz-
ardous side eects associated with a drug.26 The McKee court crystallized the
position of many other state courts and rearmed the general common law
principle { pharmacists do not have a broad duty to warn their customers of
241d. at 1253 o54.
25113 Wash.2d 701, 782 F.2d 1045 (1989).
261d at 1055 o56.
8the potential dangers of prescription drug use.27
B.Statutory Regulation
In a signicant departure from the established case law, Congress
created a positive duty to warn for pharmacists in the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990. As an amendment to the Social Security Act, OBRA
ordered states to implement regulatory programs consistent with its pharmacy
mandate that:
(I) The pharmacist must oer to discuss with each individual receiving
benets under this subchapter...matters which...the pharmacist deems signi-
cant including the following:
... (dd) Common severe side or adverse eects or interactions and
therapeutic contraindications that may be encountered
A more controversial provision follows:
...(II) A reasonable eort must be made by the pharmacist to obtain,
record, and maintain at least the following information regarding individuals
receiving benets under this subchapter:
...(bb) Individual history where signicant, including disease state or
states, known allergies and drug reactions, and a comprehensive list of medica-
tions and relevant devices.28
Some commentators have argued that OBRA's pharmacy mandate
merely codies existing common law principles.29 The more prevalent interpre-
271d at 1049 o52.
2842 U.S.C. S1396r o8(g)(2)(A)(ii).
292 J. Pharmacy & L. 127 at 138.
9tation, and the one supported by the Act's legislative history,30 reads OBRA as
creating a duty to warn on the part of pharmacists beyond any standard estab-
lished by state courts. Though OBRA did not become eective until January
1, 1993, many states adopted the pharmacy mandate almost immediately.31
C.Negative Reaction Against The Duty To Warn
Given OBRA's unsettling eect upon the duty to warn doctrine
for prescription drugs, it is not surprising that many commentators view this
change as an unsound shift in the law. Much of the criticism of the pharmacy
mandate stems from one of two arguments. First, some claim that the high costs
of implementing a duty to warn does not justify a change in the legal scheme. A
second group fears that a duty to warn on the part of pharmacists will interfere
with and reduce the eectiveness of the physician-patient relationship.
Members of the rst school of critics call attention to the costly
nature of a changed doctrine. One study approximates the costs of a duty to
warn regime to be between $70 and $140 million per year.32 Such considerable
cost derives from two sources. At the most basic level, OBRA will demand
more work-hours from pharmacists. In order to comply with the Act, pharma-
cists must take the extra time to investigate prescription drug hazards, counsel
patients about potential side eects, and create and update patient medical
history.33 Pharmacies will have to hire more professionals and employ larger
301n the Senate debate over the Act, Senator Pryor expressed his view that the purpose of
the act was to enhance the role of pharmacists in providing quality medical care 136 Cong.
Rec. S5982-04 (daily ed. May 10, 1990).
31Kessler, 325 New. Eng. J. Med. at 1650. As an amendment to the Social Security Act,
OBRA only applies to Medicaid patients. Probably in a move to ensure equal protection,
states have ordered that pharmacists counsel all patients, not just those on Medicaid. Id.
32s~th & West, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. at 141.
33Michael J. Holleran, The Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of1990:
10technical support teams. Some commentators note that the mandate requires
pharmacies to install new computer hardware and software, and furnish clinics
with designated counseling areas to provide the type of counseling OBRA re-
quires.34 These increased operational costs, of course, mean higher prices for
prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services.
Along with higher operational costs, liability costs, including litiga-
tion costs and insurance costs, will force pharmacies to further raise the price of
their prescription drug products. Small pharmacies in competition with diver-
sied megadrug stores, unable to absorb the barrage of cost increases, may be
driven out of business.35 Such a reduction in competition will only exacerbate
price ination, pricing out less auent, and maybe more needy, prescription
drug consumers. Thus, this cost-conscious school argues that the increase in
prices resulting from implementation of a duty to warn will hurt consumers.
Those worried about the aect on the physician-patient relation-
ship comprise the second group of OBRA critics. Not surprisingly, the leader
of this charge is the American Medical Association.36 Reective of the ratio-
nale behind the learned intermediary doctrine, the AMA fears that mandatory
pharmacist counseling will adversely interfere with the traditional tie between
physician and patient.37 Doctors argue that intrusion by pharmacists into the
health care dynamic attenuates the control physicians have over their patients'
Federal Law Shifts the Duty to Warn From the Physician to the Pharmacist, 26 Akron L.
Rev. 77, 97 (1992).
34Angelo J. Patane, OBRA '90 and Developing Case Law: Will the New Revolution Live
Up To Its Underlying Goals?, 1 J. Pharmacy & L. 177, 185 (1992-93).
351d. at 186.
36Smith & West, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. at 140.
371d.
11drug therapy, reducing the eectiveness of treatment. Though highly competent
professionals, pharmacists should not engage in physician-like duties,38 and the
legal regime should not foster an environment of second-guessing.39 Moreover,
proper treatment requires a relationship of trust between patient and health
care provider. The physician-patient, not the pharmacist-patient, relationship
most closely reaches this ideal. Indeed, many individuals are uncomfortable
with inquiries into medical history made by pharmacists.40 In order to insure
the most eective treatment of patients, this school concludes, the legal rules
must preserve the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship.
IV.The Case For A Duty To Warn
A.An Alternative Proposal
In its current form, the duty to warn may well merit the negative
reaction which has followed OBRA. For the sake of public safety, however, the
duty to warn deserves implementation. A careful reworking of the duty to warn
doctrine, including a reform of OBRA'S pharmacy mandate, will return benets
to society in terms of saved costs and eective treatment.
What is problematic in OBRA' s pharmacy mandate is its irtation
with holding pharmacists liable qua physicians. A more eective approach would
capitalize on separate areas of expertise of physicians and pharmacists. Speci-
cally, the law must tap pharmacists' knowledge of drug characteristics without
intruding into the physician-patient relationship. To this end, lawmakers must
repeal or severely limit that part of OBRA's pharmacy mandate which requires
38Patane, 1 J. Pharmacy & L. at 188.
39smith & West, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. at 139.
401d at 142.
12pharmacists to maintain individual patient histories for the purposes of drug
counseling.41 The reasoning behind both the learned intermediary doctrine and
the AMA argument against OBRA nds its basis on a sound principle { personal
physicians are in the best position to maintain detailed information regarding
the patient's medical history. It should remain the physician's responsibility to
warn patients about adverse drug reactions related to a particular medical con-
dition. Beyond a quick inquiry into major allergies and reactions, pharmacists
should not delve into a patient's individual medical history. Such counseling
should remain outside the province of a pharmacist's responsibilities and should
not be an element of his duty to warn.
Instead, the duty to warn for pharmacists should focus on their
ability to provide customers full information regarding the characteristics of pre-
scription drugs. Based on the manufacturers' drug insert, this warning should
revolve around nonjudgmental information. That is, the law should require
pharmacists to warn customers of the hazards commonly related to the drug,
but should not expect the pharmacist to alert patients to side eects linked to
the customer's personal medical history. That obligation to provide patient-
specic warnings rests with the physician. However, where a pharmacist has
actual knowledge of a contraindicatory condition on the part of the customer,
or of an obvious error in the physician's instructions, the law should require
action. The rulings in Hand and Rift, therefore, deserve crystallization at the
federal level. Such a system of risk management,42 would enable pharmacists
41Id.
42Greeri, 24 Creighton L. Rev, at 1476.
13to exercise their considerable knowledge and expertise as professionals without
intruding into or detracting from the role and eectiveness of the physician.
B.Responding To The Critics
Opponents of OBRA are right to look to the costs of the program
in assessing its merit. A similar analysis of the alternative model outlined above
indicates that the economic benets outweigh its costs. Safer drug use represents
an obvious and direct eect of implementing an enhanced role for pharmacists in
the health care systems' warning mechanism. A duty to warn will strengthen the
pharmacists' link in the communication chain leading to the patient. The logic
is straightforward: safer use of prescription drugs results in fewer injuries from
misuse, leading to reduced hospital costs, and ultimately returning savings to
society. Put simply, when patients are more informed of the potential hazards
of prescription drug use, they are able to avoid injury and minimize medical
costs for society.
Critics of OBRA ascribe much of the program's cost increases to
that portion of the pharmacy mandate that requires pharmacists to maintain
individual patient medical histories. The proposed model of the duty to warn
removes this obligation from pharmacists. Instead, pharmacists must only warn
customers of drug-specic hazards. Pharmacists will be held responsible for
patient-specic hazards only where the cost of acquiring that actual knowledge
of the patient's condition is minimal.43 To fulll their obligation, pharmacists
must only maintain and convey nonjudgmental information regarding hazards
43eq. Hand, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1982).
14associated with prescription drugs (knowledge readily obtainable through infor-
mation provided to pharmacists by manufacturers). Indeed, given that phar-
macists receive extensive education in counseling patients,44 any rule that does
not include such drug counseling among the pharmacists' responsibilities aggra-
vates the underutilization of that professional's training. The benets in terms
of saved lives and medical costs far outweigh any added costs of conveying this
information to customers.
To further curtail costs, the alternative regime should incorporate
elements limiting pharmacists' liability. To keep liability costs down, the doc-
trine could include a cap on recovery or a short statute of limitations. Since
the alternative scheme aims to keep both operational and liability costs to a
minimum, returns to society in economic terms alone should far outweigh any
added costs.
The alternative duty to warn scheme will also avoid interjecting
the pharmacist into the physician-patient relationship. Instead of forcing phar-
macists to usurp the physicians traditional role, the proposed regime builds
toward a cooperative model of health care.45 While physicians will prescribe
drugs in light of the individual medical condition of their patient, pharmacists
will dispense drugs to their customers along with information regarding the po-
tential hazards particular to that drug. Thus, without unwanted interference,
both the physician can utilize her patient-specic knowledge and the pharma-
cist can employ his drug-specic expertise. Further, when operating eciently,
44Green 24 creighton L. Rev, at 1468, 1475; Brushwood, 40 Drake L. Rev, at 6-7 n. 22, 23;
Victor Fuchs, Who Shall Live? (1975).
45Smith & West, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. at 141 o142.
15this alternative liability scheme will relieve physicians of the obligation to in-
form patients of drug hazards that pharmacist may be better suited to convey.46
With some of their responsibility shifted to lower cost professionals (i.e. phar-
macists), doctors can make more ecient use of their time and training. A
health care system in which physicians and pharmacists eciently employ their
expertise, unplagued by charges of professional interference, promises patients
more eective drug treatment.
C.The Duty to Warn and Drug Regulation Theory
In addition to its cost-eectiveness and ecient utilization of med-
ical professional expertise, the proposed duty to warn regime also ts squarely
with the theoretical objectives of drug regulation in America. The government
aims its regulation of drug products in this country toward ve ends: full infor-
mation, safety, eectiveness, minimal administrative costs, and the preservation
of market incentives. To justify implementation, the alternative model for the
pharmacist's duty to warn outlined above, must pass muster when measured
against these objectives.
First, placing a duty to warn on pharmacists will provide more
complete information to the public regarding their prescription drugs. Draw-
ing from free market theory, full or perfect information stands as a prerequisite
to maximized consumer choice. An informed choice is only possible when the
consumer is aware of the characteristics of a product, including its potential
hazards as well as its benets. Because of the enhanced role of the pharma-
46Pharmacists' expertise of drug characteristics and the close proximity to drug consumption
of their position along the conununications timeline may render them better osuited to warn
patients of prescription drug hazards than physicians.
16cist, the proposed model aords consumers a more thorough assessment of a
drug's characteristics. By exhaulting complete understanding of the consump-
tion product, the scheme facilitates the exercise of consumer choice, a large step
toward maximizing consumer welfare.
Second, as discussed above, the proposed duty to warn regime cre-
ates an environment of heightened safety. In the example at the start of this
paper, the suciently forewarned patient will know better than to take cough
syrup while undergoing treatment with Flagyl. For that hypothetical patient,
like millions of real patients, the additional warning means protection from in-
jury.
Third, a duty to warn enables consumers to maximize the eective-
ness of their prescription drug treatment. A public that is more fully informed
of prescription drug hazards will be better equipped to manage their treatment.
Not only will patients know what toxic combinations to avoid, they will be cog-
nizant of the most eective means to administer the drug (time of day, before
or after meal, etc.). Through this mechanism, the duty to warn will promote
the most eective treatment possible.
Fourth, a duty to warn on the part of pharmacists will not burden
the FDA or other government agencies with any additional administrative costs.
Enforcement of the duty falls on the shoulders of the liability system, not the
government. As discussed above, liability and operational costs are inevitable,
yet they are minimal in comparison to the economic promises of this legal rule.
Unlike labeling, good manufacturing practices, and other regulatory require-
17ments of prescription drugs, a duty to warn will not deplete FDA resources.
Fifth, market incentives to invent and manufacture prescription
drugs remain intact under the proposed duty to warn regime. By providing
an additional source of warning to the consumer, the proposed legal regime
will result in fewer injuries from prescription drugs. Fewer injuries not only
translate into less liability for drug manufacturers, but also build public trust
in the products of these companies. Both of these factors will bolster the eco-
nomic strength of drug producers. Rather than deter manufacturers, this will
encourage drug innovation and production. Moreover, to the benet of drug
companies and consumers, the strengthened warning system may accelerate the
marketing of some dangerous yet potentially life-saving drugs. Total risk of a
prescription drug is comprised of its intrinsic risk and that risk associated with
underwarning. By reducing the later component, a duty to warn will lower
total risk. Drugs previously too dangerous to market, may then fall below the
market-safe threshold. This will help needy patients and at the same time en-
hance the prot opportunities of drug companies. Beyond the mere preservation
of ecient incentives for drug manufacturers, the proposed duty to warn model
may well serve as a boon to many needy patients.
V.CONCLUSION
The hypothetical that began this paper is a far too common reality
in America today. Such potential for injury demands action. In the search for
a system which will suciently warn the public of prescription drug hazards,
we must keep in mind the many concerns that are fundamental to a successful
18legal regime. Moreover, it is essential that the nal set of legal rules comprise a
holistically coherent model. The regime proposed in this paper aspires to this
end. It promotes sound economics and eective medicine, but most importantly,
the proposed model presents a system that is consistent with modern drug
regulation theory.
19